ずくなしの冷や水

2021年08月18日

ショイグ

ロシアの国防大臣ショイグです。



posted by ZUKUNASHI at 21:08| Comment(0) | 国際・政治

かかっても構わない人はさっさとかかって消えていってほしい

サービス業に従事する知人が、緊急事態宣言でサービス業は自粛しなればならないのかな、補償がないから休むこともできないしと悩んでいます。

繁華街にいますから街の賑わいを直接見ています。酒を出す店は大賑わいだと言っています。

ワクチン接種が進んでも感染は減らない状況を見て、今の政府の対策じゃ感染拡大は収まらない、こうなるとかかってもよいという人、かかることを覚悟して動き回っている人は、さっさと感染して消えて行ってもらうしかないよな、と。

消えて行ってくれればそれでいいが、感染して回復した人は、抗体ありということで、自分は無敵だと思ってさらに大胆な行動をとるかもしれないな、と応じたら落ち込んでいました。

こんな人も多いんですからね。
2021年08月17日
日本もテロがはびこっている どんどん増えるぞ

感染者に対する風当りが強くなるのではないでしょうか。



posted by ZUKUNASHI at 19:38| Comment(0) | Covid19

この方はタリバン指導部の幹部らしい



上の写真はガンタナモ収容所の画像を背景にした合成画像

収容されていた時の写真のようです。


右側にいるのはタリバン政治部のスポークスマン。Khairullah Khairkhwaが口をはさんでいます。Khairkhwaは国際交渉にも出席しています。



以下は、日本の公安調査庁のサイトから転載・・・古くて使えません。
ア 指導者,幹部等
(ア) ハイバトゥッラー・アーフンドザーダ(Haibatullah Akhundzada)
別名:
ムッラー・ハイバトゥッラー・アーフンザーダ(Mullah Haibatullah Akhunzada),マウラウィ・ハイバトラ・アクンドザダ(Mawlavi Haibatullah Akhundzadah), シェイフ・サーヒブ・ハイバトゥッラー・アーフンザーダ( Sheikh Sahib Haibatullah Akhunzada), ハイバトッラー・アーホンドザーデ( Haibatollah Akhondzade)など

最高指導者(三代目)。1967年10月19日生まれ。アフガニスタン南部・カンダハール州出身。パシュトゥン人ドゥッラーニー部族連合ヌールザイ族の出自。ソ連軍のアフガニスタン侵攻を受け,一家でパキスタンに移住し,同地で宗教教育を受けた。2016年5月,「タリバン」最高指導者アフタール・モハンマド・マンスール(後述)の死亡に伴い,副指導者から最高指導者に就任し,「アミール・ウル・モミニーン」(「信仰者たちの指導者」)の地位を継承。

(イ) モハンメド・オマル(Mohammed Omar)(死亡)
別名:
ムッラー・モハンマド・オマル(MullahMohammedOmar),ムハンマド・ウマル(Muhammad Umar)
設立者・初代最高指導者。1960年生まれ。カンダハール州ハクリーズ郡出身(注5)。パシュトゥン人ギルザイ部族連合ホタキ族の出自。

(ウ) アフタル・モハンマド・マンスール・シャー・モハンマド(Akhtar Mohammad Mansour Shah Mohammad)(死亡)
別名:
アフタル・ムハンマド・マンスール・ハーン・ムハンマド(Akhtar Muhammad Mansor Khan Muhammad)など

前最高指導者。1968年生まれ。カンダハール州出身。パシュトゥン人ドゥッラーニー部族連合イシャクザイ族の出自。2015年7月,最高指導者オマルの死亡発表に伴い,最高指導者及び「アミール・ウル・モミニーン」の地位を継承。「タリバン」政権下で航空・運輸相,カンダハール州空軍司令官を務めた。2010年2月にアブドゥル・ガーニ・バラーダル副指導者がパキスタン当局に拘束された後は,同人の後任の一人として,「指導者評議会」を主導した。

(エ) シラージュッディン・ジャラーロウディン・ハッカーニ(Sirajuddin Jallaloudine Haqqani)
別名:
シラージュッディーン・ハッカーニー(Sirajudin Haqqani),シラージ・ハッカーニ(Siraj Haqqani),セラージュッディン・ハカニ(Serajuddin Haqani),サラージ・ハカニ(Saraj Haqani),ハリファ(Khalifa)など

副指導者の一人(2015年7月就任)。1973〜1978年の生まれ。パキスタン北西部・KP州北ワジリスタン地区ミランシャー又はアフガニスタン南東部・パクティア州出身。パシュトゥン人カルラニ部族連合ザドラン族の出自。「ハッカーニ・ネットワーク」(HQN)(後述)指導者も務める。
20代前半までは目立った活動はなかったが,その後,積極的に武装闘争に関与してきたとされ,現在も「アルカイダ」との関係を維持しているとされる。
国連安保理「アルカイダ」及び「タリバン」制裁委員会は,2007年9月,同人を制裁対象に指定した。

(オ) モハンマド・ヤクーブ(Mohammad Yaqoob)
別名:
ムッラー・ムハンマド・ヤアクーブ(Mullah Muhammad Yaqoob/Yaqoub/Yaqub),エミール・ムッラー・ヤクブ(Emir Mullah Yaqub)
副指導者の一人(2016年5月就任)。1990年生まれ。「タリバン」初代最高指導者オマルの息子。
2015年7月,マンスールの最高指導者就任に反発して,叔父アブドゥル・マナン(Abdul Manan,初代最高指導者オマルの弟)と共に指導部と距離を置いていたが,後にマンスールと和解した。2016年5月,マンスールの死亡に伴い,副指導者の一人に就任した。

(カ) ムッラー・アブドゥル・ガニ・バラーダル(Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar)
別名:
ムッラー・アブドゥル・ガニー・バラーダル(Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar),ムッラー・バラダール・アーフンド(Mullah Abdul Akhund)

政務担当副指導者兼在カタール政治事務所代表(2019年1月24日就任)。1968年生まれ。アフガニスタン南部・ウルズガン州出身。パシュトゥン人ドゥッラーニー部族連合ポパルザイ族の出自。「タリバン」政権下で防衛副大臣を務めた。

「タリバン」設立者の1人であり,2001年以降,最高指導者(当時)オマルが潜伏していたことから,副指導者としてその任務の多くを代行していたとされる。
2010年2月にパキスタン当局に拘束されたが,2018年10月に釈放された。

「タリバン」は,声明で同人の政治事務所代表就任を「米国と進行中の交渉を強化し,適切に対処するために採られた措置である」と発表した。

(キ) モハンマド・ラスール・アーフンド(Mohammad Rasul Akhund)
別名:
アユーブ・モハンマド・ラスール(Ayyub Mohammad Rasul),ムッラー・モハンマド・ラスール・ヌールザイ(Mullah Mohammad Rassoul Noorzai)

「タリバン」反主流派「アフガニスタン・イスラム首長国高等評議会」指導者。1958〜1965年の生まれ。カンダハール州又はアフガニスタン西部・ファラ州出身。パシュトゥン人ドゥッラーニー部族連合ヌールザイ族の出自。「タリバン」設立当初から,最高指導者(当時)オマルの信任が厚く,「タリバン」政権では,アフガニスタンの南部・ニームローズ州及び西部・ファラ州の州知事を務めた。「タリバン」政権崩壊時にイランへ逃亡したが,政権崩壊後もオマルと緊密な関係を保っていたとされる。

2015年11月,マンスールの最高指導者(当時)就任に反対する勢力によって,同「評議会」指導者に選出された。現在,パキスタン当局に拘束されているとされる(注6)。

国連安保理「アルカイダ」及び「タリバン」制裁委員会は,2001年4月,同人を制裁対象に指定した。
(ク) アブドゥル・カビール・モハンマド・ジャン(Abdul Kabir Mohammad Jan)

別名:
マウラヴィ・アブドゥル・カビール(Maulavi Abdul Kabil),A・カビール(A Kabir)

「指導者評議会」メンバー。1963年頃の生まれ。アフガニスタン北東部・バグラーン州又は南東部・パクティア州出身。パシュトゥン人カルラニ部族連合ザドラン族の出自。

「タリバン」政権下で,閣僚評議会第二副議長(経済担当),東部・ナンガルハール州知事,東部地区作戦司令官などを歴任した。

HQNと強い関係を持つとされる。これまで,パキスタン当局に2回(2005年,2010年)拘束されたが,いずれも釈放されている。

国連安保理「アルカイダ」及び「タリバン」制裁委員会は,2001年2月,同人を制裁対象に指定した。
(ケ) シェール・モハンマド・アッバス・スタネクザイ(Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanekzai)

在カタール政治事務所副代表。1963年生まれ。アフガニスタン中央部・ローガル州出身。パシュトゥン人ギルザイ部族連合スタネクザイ族の出自。「タリバン」政権下で外務副大臣及び保健副大臣を務めた。

2001年の「タリバン」政権崩壊後は目立った活動はなかったが,2012年,在カタール政治事務所設立のため,カタールに渡った後,同政治事務所設立とともに副代表に就任した。その後,2015年8月にタイヤブ・アガ政治事務所代表が辞任したことから,代表代行に就任し,同年11月,正式に代表に就任した。その後,2019年1月に,バラーダルの「タリバン」副指導者及び同事務所代表就任と同時に,副代表に戻った。

国連安保理「アルカイダ」及び「タリバン」制裁委員会は,2001年2月,同人を制裁対象に指定した。
(コ) アブドゥル・ワセイ・ムタシム・アガ(Abdul Wasay Mu'tasim Agha)
別名:
ムタシム・アガ・ジャン(Mutasim Aga Jan),アガ・ジャン(Agha Jan),アブドゥル・ワセイ・アガ・ジャン・モタセム(Abdul Wasay Agha Jan Motasem)

元政治委員会委員長,元財務委員会委員長。湾岸諸国における資金調達役であったとされる。1968年又は1971年生まれ。カンダハール州出身。「タリバン」政権下では財務大臣に就いた。最高指導者(当時)オマルとは義理の親子関係にあるとされる。

「タリバン」内部で,武装闘争よりも政治的アプローチの必要性を主張していたことから,2011年8月頃,パキスタン南部・シンド州カラチで,「タリバン」内の強硬派に銃撃された後,全役職を解任され,療養先のトルコを拠点に活動していたとされる(注7)。2014年4月には,滞在先のアラブ首長国連邦(UAE)で,同国当局に拘束され,アフガニスタンに送還された。

国連安保理「アルカイダ」及び「タリバン」制裁委員会は,2001年2月,同人を制裁対象に指定したが,和平交渉に向けた動きを推進させるためとして,2012年7月,同人に対する制裁を解除した。

ロイター2021/8/18
アフガン、タリバン指導者アクンザダ師が実権 評議会設置=幹部
[18日 ロイター] - アフガニスタンの全権を掌握したイスラム主義組織タリバンの幹部がロイターのインタビューに応じ、アフガニスタンは評議会により統治され、タリバンの最高指導者ハイバトゥラ・アクンザダ師が実権を握る公算が大きいと述べた。

インタビューに応じたのはタリバンのワヒードラ・ハシミ氏。ハシミ氏は、評議会議長が大統領のような役割を果たし、アクンザダ師は評議会議長の上に立つ公算があると英語で述べた。

その上で、アクンザダ師の副官がいわゆる「大統領」の役割を果たす可能性があると語った。アクンザダ師にはMawlavi Yaqoob氏、Sirajuddin Haqqani氏、Abdul Ghani Baradar氏の3人の副官がいる。

タリバンがアフガニスタンをどのように統治するかについて、多くの点で最終決定されていないとしながらも、アフガニスタンが民主国家になることはないと言明。「われわれの国には民主主義の土台が全くないため、民主的なシステムは構築されない。どのような政治システムをアフガニスタンに適用するか、われわれが話し合うことはない。イスラム法(シャリーア)以外の統治はない」と述べた。

Abdul Ghani Baradar


まだよくわかりません。
posted by ZUKUNASHI at 14:58| Comment(0) | 国際・政治

The only truth about US disastrous Afghanistan war is that it was all based on lies

RT2021/8/17
The only truth about US disastrous Afghanistan war is that it was all based on lies
by Scott Ritter
The stunning victory of the Taliban over the US-backed Afghan government raises more questions than it answers as to how this happened. In the search for answers, however, don’t ask the generals who fought the war – they all lied.
米国が支援するアフガニスタン政府に対するタリバンの見事な勝利は、なぜこのようなことが起こったのかについて、答えよりも多くの疑問を投げかけている。しかし、答えを探すために、戦争を戦った将軍たちに聞いてはいけない。彼らは皆、嘘をついていたのだ。
Let me begin with full disclosure – I have never set foot in Afghanistan. I have zero skin equity in this current debacle. I have lost very close friends to the conflict that tore that country apart these past 20 years, and I do mourn their loss. What I lack in on-the-ground warfighting resume entries, however, is somewhat compensated by a more intellectually based approach toward the conflict in Afghanistan.
私はアフガニスタンに足を踏み入れたことがありません。私はアフガニスタンに足を踏み入れたことはありませんし、今回の騒動に関与したこともありません。過去20年間にアフガニスタンを引き裂いた紛争で非常に親しい友人を亡くしており、彼らの死を悼んでいる。しかし、私に欠けている現場での戦いの履歴書の記載は、アフガニスタンの紛争に対するより知的に基づいたアプローチによって多少補われている。
As a historian, I have studied the tribes of Afghanistan, especially their penchant for conflict against ruling authority which deviates from what they expect from their leaders. My specialty was (and is) the Basmachi resistance to Soviet authority in the 1920s and 1930s. More specifically, my studies focused on those elements of Basmachi which settled in Kabul and northern Afghanistan, and who helped overthrow an Afghan King and later were defeated by a Pashtun tribal army.
私は歴史家として、アフガニスタンの部族を研究してきました。特に、彼らが指導者に期待することから逸脱した支配者との対立を好む傾向があります。私が専門としていたのは、1920年代から1930年代にかけてのソビエトの権威に対するバスマチ族の抵抗でした。より具体的には、カブールやアフガニスタン北部に定住し、アフガニスタン王の転覆を支援し、後にパシュトゥーン族の軍隊に敗れたバスマチの一部に焦点を当てて研究しています。
Not too many Americans are familiar with the names of Ibrahim Bez, Fuzail Maksum, Amanullah, Habibullah, and Nadir Khan, or the military campaign of 1930-31 to secure northern Afghanistan from the Basmachi. If they were, however, they would have a foundation of understanding when it comes to the complexity of Afghan tribal politics, and why any effort to impose a foreign system by force could never succeed.
イブラヒム・ベズ、フザイル・マクスム、アマンウラ、ハビブラ、ナディール・カーンの名前や、バスマチからアフガニスタン北部を守るための1930-31年の軍事作戦について知っているアメリカ人はあまり多くない。しかし、もしそうであれば、アフガニスタンの部族政治の複雑さや、外国の制度を力ずくで押し付けようとしても決して成功しない理由について、理解の基礎を得ることができるだろう。
I spent two years studying Afghanistan from the perspective of a military intelligence officer, in my role as the lead analyst for the 7th Marine Amphibious Brigade on the Soviet war in Afghanistan (the 7th Brigade was the Marine component of the Rapid Deployment Force, and Afghanistan was part of our area of operations). I watched in real time as the various Soviet campaigns targeting the Afghan Mujahideen were defeated on terrain that, years later, would play host to US military forces fighting the very same enemy.
私は、第7海兵隊水陸両用旅団の主任分析官として、軍情報将校の視点からアフガニスタンを2年間研究した(第7旅団は、迅速展開部隊の海兵隊部門であり、アフガニスタンは作戦地域の一部であった)。私は、アフガンのムジャヒディーンを標的としたソ連のさまざまな作戦が、数年後に同じ敵と戦う米軍を迎え撃つことになる地形で敗北するのをリアルタイムで見ていた。
I was in the Soviet Union when Moscow, admitting defeat, finally pulled its troops out of that nation. My reporting based upon interviews with Afghan war veterans on the tactics of the Mujahideen were valued by the US military attaché office in Moscow. I read the Russian newspaper reporting and the first generation of Russian war memoirs to get a fresh take on the Russian experience in Afghanistan, and later used this foundational knowledge to better absorb Western assessments of Russian military performance such as Lester Grau’s outstanding “The Bear went over the Mountain.”
モスクワが敗北を認め、ついに軍隊を撤退させたとき、私はソ連にいた。アフガン戦争の経験者へのインタビューをもとに、ムジャヒディーンの戦術について書いた私の記事は、モスクワの米軍駐在員事務所で評価された。私はロシアの新聞報道や第一世代の戦争回顧録を読んで、アフガニスタンでのロシアの経験について新しい見解を得たが、後にこの基礎知識を使って、レスター・グラウの傑出した「熊は山を越えた」のようなロシア軍のパフォーマンスに対する西洋の評価をよりよく吸収することができた。
I have also served in tactical, operational, and theater commands in war and peace, and understand the intimate limitations of “ground truth” as experienced by junior enlisted and officers alike, and the absolute disconnect from reality that exists in higher commands. A sergeant or captain doesn’t know what the colonel and general know about the strategic picture, just as the colonel and general do not know what the sergeant and captain have experienced from the perspective of the tip of the spear. Having never served in Afghanistan, when seen in this light, is a liberating factor, since I am not constrained by the prejudices accrued from either perspective.
私は、戦時中も平時中も、戦術、作戦、劇場の各司令部に勤務した経験があり、下士官や将校が経験する「地上の真実」の密接な限界と、上級司令部に存在する現実との絶対的な乖離を理解している。軍曹や大尉は、大佐や将軍が知っている戦略的構想を知らないし、大佐や将軍は、軍曹や大尉が槍の穂先の視点から経験したことを知らないのと同じである。アフガニスタンに派遣されたことがないということは、どちらの視点からの偏見にも縛られないという意味で、開放的な要素であると言えるでしょう。

By way of this introduction, I offer the following assessment of the unfolding situation confronted by the United States in Afghanistan today:
以上、アフガニスタンで米国が直面している状況について、私は次のように評価している。

We lost.
我々は負けた。
Blame the generals. Blame the troops. Blame the spies. Blame the diplomats. Blame the politicians. Blame the American people. But most importantly, blame the generals.
将軍たちを非難する。将軍のせい。スパイを責めるべきだ。外交官のせい。政治家のせいにする。アメリカ国民を責める。しかし、最も重要なのは、将軍たちを責めることです。


Let me explain.
説明しましょう。
In ancient Rome, when a military unit failed to perform, it was subjected to a process known as decimation, where 10% of the ranks would be executed as a means of instilling discipline and a fighting spirit – literally putting the fear of death into those involved. While I am not promoting such a radical approach when dealing with the military failures in Afghanistan that have transpired over the course of the past 20 years, I will note that failure should have consequences. And yet for the vast majority of those who served in Afghanistan (all of whom failed, in one form or another), the consequences of their failure have been the awarding of medals and promotions accrued from that experience. Any military organization with a modicum of honor and integrity would understand that the process that allowed military failure to unfold in slow motion over the course of two decades could only occur in an environment which encouraged and sustained this process by rewarding failure.

The military award system is designed to reward performance above and beyond that which is required through the normal performance of one’s duties. Given that the US military has traditionally had a very high bar of professionalism when it comes to the tasks it performs, “normal” is actually a very high standard. As such, to be given a medal in recognition of service should be by exception, requiring acts that represent an upward deviation from the “norm.” This is especially true about combat. Awards for valor must involve something more than simply closing with and destroying the enemy through firepower and maneuver – one should not be recognized as exceptional for simply doing their job.

The US military spent 20 years in Afghanistan. Careers were defined by this war, and awards and other recognitions handed out liberally as a result. A successful “tour” was noted by the issuance of medals deemed appropriate to the mission, not the result. While many awards were issued to deserving personnel, many more were given to people who were simply doing their job. Why the focus on medals? Because the issuance of medals requires the generation of paperwork that documents the actions for which the medal was being awarded. If one creates an inflated awards system, then the paperwork generated to sustain this system is itself creating a narrative of performance that is inflated. Truth becomes the victim, and the lie a necessary evil to promote the careers of those whose careers were defined by the Afghan conflict.

The medals you see on the chests of those who served in Afghanistan in many ways document the many lies told over the course of the past 20 years that helped shape the narrative that has unceremoniously collapsed before the world within the past few days.

One way for the military to restore its honor would be to convene a board which would review every award issued because of the Afghan conflict, with an eye to downgrading/revoking those which do not meet the original intent of the award. Start by immediately revoking the Distinguished Service Medals issued to every general officer who ever served in Afghanistan. You don’t get a medal for losing, and you damn sure don’t get a medal for lying to Congress, the president, the American people, and, most importantly, your troops.

And make no mistake – every single one of the generals who commanded American forces in Afghanistan lied. They lied to Congress – and Congress knew it and did nothing about it. One could write a PhD thesis on political malfeasance simply by reviewing the testimony of these commanders before Congress, and the fawning adoration Congress bestowed upon every one of them. No hard questions. No insistence upon fact-based answers. Just a simple vindication of the lies being told, and the repeated passage of budgets which continued to fund these lies.

Every soldier and junior officer on the ground knew the truth about the capabilities (or lack thereof) of their Afghan counterparts. These veterans today may speak with high praise about those select few Afghans (their interpreters, or “terps”) with whom they could interact, but they are more guarded about the vast majority of the Afghans with whom they shared no linguistic or cultural bond. There was nothing there – no connection.

Without any connection, there could be no constructive interaction, and that means there could be no meaningful training, and so on and so forth. The frontline troops knew that their Afghan counterparts were incapable of fighting on their own. And yet, because the mission required the Americans to certify that the Afghans were “taking the lead” in the fight against the Taliban, these units were certified as combat capable, and that certification briefed to Congress. Medals were awarded. Careers were enhanced. And it was all a lie.

The entire Afghan conflict must be examined considering this reality – everything is a lie. Every battle, every campaign, every contract written and implemented – everything was founded in a lie.

Patrick Tilman was given a Silver Star – the nation’s third highest award for heroism in combat – for being killed by his own men. “Caught between the crossfire of an enemy near ambush,” the citation read, “Corporal Tillman put himself in the line of devastating enemy fire as he maneuvered his fire team to a covered position from which they could effectively employ their weapons on known enemy positions.” Not a word of this was true, and the Army knew it. But Tilman, a former NFL player, was a big name, and his death had to be glorious, and not the result of military incompetence.

It was all lies.

Recent statements by US Secretary of State Tony Blinken suggest that the US mission in Afghanistan ended when we killed Bin Laden. And yet Admiral McRaven, when speaking of the operation to kill Bin Laden, noted that there wasn’t anything fundamentally special about that mission in terms of the tactics. “I think that night we ran 11 or 12 [other] missions in Afghanistan,” McRaven noted. Clearly there was a military focus beyond simply killing Bin Laden. It was secretive work, reportedly involving the assassination of Taliban members, that often resulted in innocent civilians beings killed.

It should be noted that, as of 2019, McRaven believed that this kind of special operations activity should be continued in Afghanistan for years to come. So much for the US mission in Afghanistan being defined by the death of Bin Laden. The mission had become death, and the careers that were defined by those deaths. And it didn’t matter that those who died were innocent, only that they died, and their deaths could be memorialized in citations that resulted in medals being pinned on some special operator’s chest, guaranteeing promotion, and continued budgetary support for a conflict deliberately designed not to end.

The fact is the war in Afghanistan did not need to be fought. We could have ended the threat posed by Bin Laden simply by negotiating with the Taliban in the aftermath of 9/11, providing the evidence we claimed to have linking Bin Laden to the terrorist attacks on the United States. Any student of Afghanistan worth their salt knows the fundamental importance of honor that is enshrined in the concepts of Pashtunwali, the unwritten ethical code that defines the traditional lifestyle of the Pashtun people. If, as we claimed, Bin Laden carried out an attack on women and children while he was living under the protection of Pashtunwali, then his dishonor is that of the Pashtun tribes. To clear their honor, they would seek justice – in this case, evicting Bin Laden and his followers from Afghanistan.

In fact, the Taliban made precisely this offer.

For America, however, this would have been an unsatisfying result. We needed blood, not justice, and we sent our troops to Afghanistan to stack bodies, which they did, in prodigious numbers. Most of these bodies were Taliban. We excused this by claiming the Taliban were providing safe haven to Bin Laden, and as such were complicit in the 9/11 attacks.

Which was a lie.

There is no easy way of saying this, but everyone who served in Afghanistan was, in one way or another, living a lie. If your “go-to” image of your experience in Afghanistan has you decked out in combat kit, weapon at the ready position, finger extended, and you don’t recognize how fundamentally incompatible that image is toward achieving peace and stability in Afghanistan, you were part of the problem. Because that image signifies a warrior prepared to kill, and then the question has to be asked, “kill whom?” and “why?”

The Russians ran out of answers for similar questions back in 1989. And the US has run out of answers today.

As the events in Afghanistan run their tragic course, it is time for every American to come to grips with the reality of what happened there, and why. The most important aspect of such an exercise must be a fundamental adherence to fact-based truths.

And the most fundamental fact-based truth about the American experience in Afghanistan is that it was all based on lies.


posted by ZUKUNASHI at 14:26| Comment(0) | 国際・政治

米国の同盟国は 敵の前では自分の力で戦う

RT2021/8/16
by Nebojsa Malic
America’s NARRATIVE failure in Afghanistan is worse than its military one – Now the entire world knows the emperor has no clothes

Afghanistan may not be the actual ‘graveyard of empires,’ but it looks set to bury at least the American one, by imploding the major narratives on which it has rested: invincibility, inevitability, prosperity and competence.

It has to be an irony above all ironies that the same man who, back in 1992, celebrated the demise of the Soviet “puppet regime” in Kabul ended up leading a US puppet regime there. Except, whereas Dr. Najibullah ruled for three years after the last Soviet soldier crossed the Friendship Bridge into Uzbekistan, Ashraf Ghani resigned and fled even before the last American boot left Afghan soil – reportedly forgetting bags of cash on the tarmac, no less.

What made the sudden and total collapse of the Afghan National Army (ANA) so devastating, however, is the explicit insistence of US leadership – from President Joe Biden and Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Mark Milley – as late as two weeks ago, that it would never happen.

“There's going to be no circumstance where you see people being lifted off the roof of an embassy in the – of the United States from Afghanistan,” Biden told reporters on July 8. Except that’s exactly what happened, and then some.

‘Saigon 1975’ is forever associated with the photo of desperate South Vietnamese mobbing a ‘Huey’ on the rooftop of the US embassy. There are several contenders for “Kabul 2021,” but so far the desperate Afghans clinging onto a US cargo plane – only to plummet to their deaths – seems a strong favorite.

“A thousand narratives collapsed in real-time,” as journalist and US Navy veteran Jack Posobiec put it. “DC theater gave way to reality.”

Jack Posobiec @JackPosobiec氏の2021/8/16のツイート
This isn’t just the Fall of Kabul. The entire leadership of the US govt disappeared today. A thousand narratives collapsed in realtime. DC theater gave way to reality. A generation of people around the world watched as the US govt was humiliated.

Afghanistan is often called the “graveyard of empires” because any outside power that tried to hold it eventually failed. That’s not strictly-speaking true – the British Empire survived the Kabul fiasco by a century, for example, and the idea that the USSR fell because of Afghanistan is a cynical narrative peddled by Washington’s Cold Warriors – but in this case, it may turn out to be.

Generals and enlisted men alike can argue the US forces never lost a battle in Afghanistan, but there’s no arguing with the fact that they lost the war. Moreover, the ANA folded despite tens of billions of dollars worth of US weapons and equipment and 20 years of training according to US standards.

Ever since the Soviet Union self-abolished in 1991, neoconservatives and neoliberals alike presented the American Empire as something inevitable, its political and economic system as the “end of history,” and all resistance to it doomed to failure. Just one word, “Afghanistan,” punctures that bubble.

As for prosperity, the countless treasure looted from Americans and poured into Afghanistan didn’t make the country wealthy, but it did keep a coterie of collaborators, transnational rent-seekers, and professional busybodies flush with cash and pretending to be useful. They built nothing and left nothing but misery in their wake; sandcastles melting before a tsunami.

“Every image coming out of Afghanistan this past weekend was an advertisement for the incompetence, arrogance, and double-dealing nature of American foreign policy leaders,” wrote journalist Matt Taibbi.

He went on to explain that the “genuine shock” on Tony Blinken’s face when confronted with reality “should tell people around the world something important about the United States: in addition to all the other things about us that are dangerous, we lack self-knowledge.”

Matt Taibbi@mtaibbi
The look of genuine shock on the faces of people like Tony Blinken this weekend should tell people around the world something important about the United States: in addition to all the other things about us that are dangerous, we lack self-knowledge.

In other words, the US political establishment got so used to creating its own reality and imposing it through media and entertainment, upon its own citizens as well as on foreigners, that it simply doesn’t know what to do when confronted with people on whom this trick doesn’t work – in this case, the Taliban.

This sort of thinking was on display last week, when a prominent “security expert” advised her colleagues to look away from the images from Afghanistan to avoid getting triggered or traumatized – as if what was happening would somehow stop or vanish if they just averted their gaze.

Except people around the world watched, and took notes. Even things entirely consistent with US mentality – such as flying dogs on passenger planes, while crowding local interpreters into cargo holds – sent an unmistakable message to any potential US ‘ally.’

Carl Zha@CarlZha
Future collaborators take note: US value your lives less than dogs
将来の協力者は注意してください。米国は犬の命よりあなたの命を粗末にします。
・・・このセンテンスは、GOOGLEでもDEEPLEでも反対の意味で翻訳されます。そこまで手を回さなければならない困った事実であることを示しています。
Carl Zha@CarlZha氏は、2021年08月14日 コービンのツイートを若い中国人に教えてもらうなんてに書いた中国人です。

ABC News@ABC
U.S. military dogs in Kabul evacuated from the city’s airport among other officials as Taliban takes control of Afghanistan. https://abcn.ws/3g9h6JF

Nor was such a conclusion reserved solely for foreigners critical of the US. Neocon Bret Stephens, writing in the New York Times, lamented the “fiasco of epic proportions” that told any US ally they’re on their own.

Timur Kuran@timurkuran
Make no mistake. This is a fiasco of epic proportions. “Every ally − Taiwan, Ukraine, the Baltic states, Israel, Japan − will draw the lesson that it is on its own in the face of its enemies. The Biden Doctrine means the burial of the Truman Doctrine.”


For an imperial enterprise built on narratives and perception management, this kind of reality bomb is highly likely to be fatal. There is no doubt that the US media machinery will launch a massive effort to deflect, spin and rationalize what happened in the coming days, perhaps even right after Biden addresses the nation on Monday. Maybe it will even work, on some people, for a while; copium is a powerful drug, after all.

Thing is, between what just happened in Afghanistan, and the years of the empire discrediting itself at home and abroad…it might not. Too many have now seen the emperor has no clothes, and that the narratives they were told to believe turned out to be smoke and mirrors.

What happens next is anybody’s guess.
posted by ZUKUNASHI at 05:27| Comment(0) | 国際・政治